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Decade
Abstract
The large majority of consumers believe that the term “privacy policy” describes a baseline level of
information practices that protect their privacy. In short, “privacy,” like “free” before it, has taken on a
normative meaning in the marketplace. When consumers see the term “privacy policy,” they believe that their
personal information will be protected in specific ways; in particular, they assume that a website that
advertises a privacy policy will not share their personal information. Of course, this is not the case. Privacy
policies today come in all different flavors. Some companies make affirmative commitments not to share the
personal information of their consumers. In other cases, however, privacy policies simply inform consumers
that unless they “opt out” of sharing certain information, the company will communicate their personal
information to other commercial entities.
Given that consumers today associate the term “privacy policy” with specific practices that afford a normative
level of privacy protection, the use of the term by a website that does not adhere to these baseline practices can
mislead consumers to expect privacy that, in reality, does not exist. This is not to suggest that companies
intend to mislead consumers, but rather that consumers today associate certain practices with “privacy policy”
just as they associate certain terms and conditions with the word “free.”
Because the term “privacy policy” has taken on a specific meaning in the marketplace and connotes a
particular level of protection to consumers, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) should regulate the use
of the term “privacy policy” to ensure that companies using the term deliver a set of protections that meet
consumers’ expectations and that the term “privacy policy” does not mislead consumers during marketplace
transactions.
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Abstract:f  The large majority of consumers believe that the term “privacy policy” 
describes a baseline level of information practices that protect their privacy.  In short, 
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“privacy,” like “free” before it, has taken on a normative meaning in the 
marketplace.  When consumers see the term “privacy policy,” they believe that their 
personal information will be protected in specific ways; in particular, they assume 
that a website that advertises a privacy policy will not share their personal 
information.  Of course, this is not the case.  Privacy policies today come in all 
different flavors.  Some companies make affirmative commitments not to share the 
personal information of their consumers.  In other cases, however, privacy policies 
simply inform consumers that unless they “opt out” of sharing certain information, 
the company will communicate their personal information to other commercial 
entities.1  
 Given that consumers today associate the term “privacy policy” with specific 
practices that afford a normative level of privacy protection, the use of the term by a 
website that does not adhere to these baseline practices can mislead consumers to 
expect privacy that, in reality, does not exist.  This is not to suggest that companies 
intend to mislead consumers, but rather that consumers today associate certain 
practices with “privacy policy” just as they associate certain terms and conditions 
with the word “free.”   
 Because the term “privacy policy” has taken on a specific meaning in the 
marketplace and connotes a particular level of protection to consumers, the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) should regulate the use of the term “privacy policy” to 
ensure that companies using the term deliver a set of protections that meet 
consumers’ expectations and that the term “privacy policy” does not mislead 
consumers during marketplace transactions. 
 
 
 
 
1 Often consumers are not provided with a means to “opt out” of information sharing. 
2007-08] TUROW, HOOFNAGLE, MULLIGAN, GOOD & GROSSKLAGS 725 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Ten years have passed since the FTC’s last comprehensive 
hearings on the future of consumer protection.  In that time, the FTC 
has pursued a self-regulatory approach to protecting the privacy of 
personal information, working with industry to deliver market-based 
approaches ranging from industry best practices, self-regulatory 
initiatives, advances in technology, and consumer education.   
 A core goal of these efforts has been to publicize how personal 
information is handled by companies, in the belief that, if armed with 
accurate information, consumers will make privacy choices consistent 
with their personal needs.  The FTC has established a set of 
disclosures that responsible companies should provide to consumers in 
order to facilitate the consumers’ exercise of informed choice about 
privacy in the marketplace. 
 Ten years later, it is appropriate to ask what effects these 
disclosures have had on consumers’ experiences in the marketplace.  
Have improved privacy disclosures allowed consumers to achieve the 
level of privacy they desire in marketplace transactions?  Are 
consumers more at ease with respect to privacy in marketplace 
transactions today then they were ten years ago?  What is the effect of 
the existence of “privacy policies” at most of the leading websites?  
What do consumers think when they see the term “privacy policy”? 
 This article attempts to answer these questions based on existing 
peer-reviewed research and consumer surveys conducted in the 
academic sector.  The article examines the strengths and limitations of 
the notice-based approach to facilitating privacy in the consumer 
marketplace.  Using (1) survey data on consumers’ privacy 
expectations, (2) existing research on whether and in what instances 
consumers read and comprehend notices, (3) the role information 
asymmetry and psychological barriers to information processing and 
risk assessment play in privacy decision-making, and (4) insights 
about interface design and information presentation, this article 
identifies several factors that limit the ability of the notice-based 
approach, operating alone, to meet the varying privacy needs of 
consumers in the marketplace.  It concludes that: 
• Without a baseline set of information practices, the term 
“privacy policy” is confusing to the consumer; 
726 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 3:3 
 
 
• The lack of common disclosure language undermines 
consumers’ ability to “shop for privacy,” thereby 
undermining businesses’ ability to compete on privacy; 
• Shortened notices are a promising step toward encouraging a 
successful privacy marketplace for the consumers who read 
notices; 
• Privacy must be “usable” if it is to serve consumer needs; 
therefore, incorporating expertise from fields such as human 
computer interaction and psychology is imperative; and 
• If consumers are not able to make informed choices about 
information privacy and computer security, then it is 
inevitable that bad actors will undermine consumer privacy 
and the security of the network infrastructure.  
 At this ten-year interval, it is important to consider the effect of the 
FTC’s approach to privacy.  Research provides important information 
about the strengths and limitations of the FTC’s work to date.  The 
FTC should use this information to refine and adjust its policy to 
reflect what we know today about consumer expectations and actions 
in the marketplace.  In addition, this article’s conclusions, listed above, 
suggest several additional interventions in the marketplace: 
• Require businesses that advertise a “privacy policy” to 
provide some baseline privacy protections that meet 
established consumer expectations; 
• Standardize disclosures and terminology to facilitate 
comparison shopping by consumers and competition among 
firms based on privacy practices; 
• Shorten notices to reduce the transaction costs associated 
with reading long, indecipherable End User License 
Agreements (“EULAs”); and, 
• Include information from other disciplines, including 
usability and human computer interaction, in future privacy 
and security initiatives. 
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II.  THE FTC’S APPROACH TO CONSUMER PRIVACY 
 Just over ten years ago, the FTC conducted its last forward-looking 
proceeding in which it analyzed the future of consumer protection in a 
high-tech economy.  In a report from that proceeding, the FTC 
concluded that the essential elements of a balanced consumer 
protection program are: 
• Coordinated law enforcement by state and federal agencies 
against fraud and deception;  
• Industry self-regulation and private initiatives to protect 
consumers; and  
• Consumer education through the combined efforts of 
government, business, and consumer groups.2 
The report continues:  
The hearing record is replete with examples of private 
initiatives:  industry self-regulation programs and plans to 
develop and expand such programs, technology-based 
consumer protections and self-help opportunities, and 
commitments to undertake new consumer education 
programs.  These and other initiatives will be crucial in 
providing consumer protection in the new marketplace.3 
 Over the past ten years, the FTC has pursued these three goals.  It 
has brought an impressive array of actions under the agency’s 
authority to prosecute unfair or deceptive trade practices.4  It has 
fostered self-regulatory programs and it continues to operate 
multilingual consumer outreach both online and offline. 
 The FTC established five Fair Information Practice Principles 
(“FIPPS”)—notice, choice, access, security and accountability—as the 
 
 
 
 
2 Federal Trade Commission, Anticipating the 21st Century: Consumer Protection Policy in 
the New High-Tech, Global Marketplace (hearing report, May 1996): 46 (formatting added). 
Also available online at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc_v2.pdf. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Marcia Hoffman, “Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of Privacy,” in Proskauer on 
Privacy (New York: Practicing Law Institute, 2006). 
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framework for self-regulatory and regulatory initiatives.  The 
Commission’s approach omitted several important data protection 
principles that were recognized by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development Guidelines (“OECD”), including the 
concepts of “data minimization,” which requires companies to restrict 
the amount of personal information collected to only that which is 
necessary for a transaction, and “purpose specification,” which 
requires companies to have a clear and legitimate purpose for data 
collection.   
 The absence of these two principles has led firms to collect 
extraneous information and to repurpose information without 
consumer consent.  After adopting its limited set of FIPPS, the FTC 
highlighted the importance of notice and security.  The agency did 
intervene to set standards for children’s privacy that are stronger than 
the norm; the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”) 
requires prior parental consent before personal information can be 
collected from children under the age of thirteen.5  In general, though, 
the agency put substantial resources behind encouraging adaptation of 
notice, and the development of “short notices.”  The market-based 
approach to privacy in the electronic commerce sphere adopted by the 
FTC was a departure from a tradition of privacy laws, such as the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”) and the Privacy Act of 1974, 
which embraced a full set of FIPPS to protect personal information.  
 Most e-commerce sites today have privacy policies, but whether 
these policies provide privacy protection remains an open question.  
The FTC has not evaluated the basic assumption of the market-based 
model to privacy protection: that with good information consumers 
will make good choices.  Echoing the recommendations from the 1995 
hearings, Chairman Majoras seeks to employ the same techniques used 
to protect privacy during the last decade: 
First, we must study and evaluate new technologies so that 
we are as prepared as possible to deal with harmful, 
collateral developments.  Second, we need to bring 
appropriate law enforcement actions to reaffirm that 
fundamental principles of FTC law apply in the context of 
new technologies.  Third, we must look to industry to 
implement self-regulatory regimes and, more importantly, to 
 
 
 
 
5 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Public Law 105-277, codified at U.S. 
Code 15 (2000), §§ 6501 et seq. 
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develop new technologies.  Finally, we need to educate 
consumers so that they can take steps to protect themselves.6 
At this important juncture, it makes sense to evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of these techniques.  Before the FTC decides what 
approaches to pursue during the next decade, we suggest that the 
agency critically reflect on research that explores the effectiveness of 
the self-regulatory system.   
 The FTC has held close the assumption that introducing additional 
information about companies’ data practices into the marketplace 
through self-regulatory systems, combined with consumer self-help, 
will allow consumers to adequately protect their privacy as they see fit.  
But research shows that consumers continue to have high levels of 
concern for privacy of personal information.  It also reveals that the 
EULAs and privacy policies used to convey this information to 
consumers are not effective—they are rarely read and are in many 
instances unreadable.  More importantly, consumers appear to believe 
that the term “privacy policy” conveys a specific level of privacy 
protection.  Confusion exists among consumers concerning what rights 
they have and can exercise over personal information.  Interestingly, 
while the FTC has pursued self-regulatory solutions to consumer 
privacy, the large majority of consumers believe incorrectly that laws 
protect their personal information from secondary use. 
III.  RESEARCH DEMONSTRATES THE LIMITS  
OF THE DISCLOSURE-BASED APPROACH 
A.  CONSUMERS CARE DEEPLY ABOUT PRIVACY  
 Surveys conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy Center show 
that Americans care deeply about the privacy of their personal 
information and that despite the FTC’s ten-year commitment to self-
regulation, they are nevertheless concerned about information 
collection.7  A 2003 Annenberg survey found that 70% of advanced 
 
 
 
 
6 Deborah Platt Majoras, “Finding the Solutions to Fight Spyware: The FTC’s Three 
Enforcement Principles,” (remarks, Anti-Spyware Coalition, Washington, D.C., February 9, 
2006): 3, http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/060209cdtspyware.pdf. 
7 Unless otherwise noted, the public polling data presented are from two national surveys 
created by Professor Turow and carried out by the firm ICR/International Communication 
Research of Media, Pennsylvania.  For the 2003 survey, infra note 8, ICR interviewed by 
phone a nationally representative sample of 1,200 adults who were using the Internet at home.  
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users agreed or agreed strongly with the statement, “I am nervous 
about websites having information about me.”8  In 2005, the same 
response was reported by 79% of respondents.9  Individuals also 
believe that they are put at risk as a result of information collection.  
Only 17% agreed with the proposition, “What companies know about 
me won’t hurt me.”10   
 A high level of concern is also reported about both commercial and 
government collection of personal information.  In 2003, 92% reported 
that they would be concerned if marketers were “collecting 
information about your household members’ activities without your 
knowledge or consent.”11  Similarly 83% would be concerned if the 
government was “collecting information about your household 
members’ activities without your knowledge or consent.”12  (52% 
believed the federal government was doing that.13)  Respondents also 
believe that they should be in control of marketing communications.  
For instance, 94% reported that websites should ask for permission 
before sending ads.14  
B.  CONSUMERS FUNDAMENTALLY MISUNDERSTAND  
THE “PRIVACY POLICY” LABEL 
 Supporters of privacy self-regulation suggest that Americans’ high 
levels of concern will be alleviated when they begin to examine their 
options for releasing personal data.  Professor Alan Westin, for 
                                                                                                                   
For the 2005 survey, infra note 9, ICR interviewed by phone a nationally representative 
sample of 1,200 adults who said they used the Internet in the past month. 
8 Joseph Turow, Americans and Online Privacy: The System is Broken (Philadelphia: 
Annenberg Public Policy Center, June 2003): 16. Also available online at 
http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/internet-privacy-report/36-page-turow-version-9.pdf. 
9 Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman and Kimberly Meltzer, Open to Exploitation: American 
Shoppers Online and Offline (Philadelphia: Annenberg Public Policy Center, June 2005): 4. 
Also available online at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/ 
Information_And_Society/Turow_APPC_Report_WEB_FINAL.pdf. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 19–20.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 19. 
14 Ibid., 28.  
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example, has written that most Americans take an informed cost-
benefit tack in relation to their information online and offline.15  “They 
examined the benefits to them or society of the data collection and use, 
wanted to know the privacy risks and how organizations proposed to 
control those, and then decided whether to trust the organization or 
seek legal oversight.”16  This characterization of most Americans as 
being aware of their online privacy options supports the viewpoint of 
Internet industry players that posting an accurate privacy policy on 
every site would create a world of optimal consumer privacy in which 
each individual shopped with his or her mouse for privacy that 
matched his or her personal needs.  
 Unfortunately that does not appear to be happening.  One could 
assume from this that consumers do not care, the argument being that 
companies give individuals information and they ignore it or fail to 
value the privacy choices it offers.  However, research tells a far more 
complex story about why privacy disclosures alone have failed to 
alleviate the privacy concerns of individuals. 
 The push for privacy disclosures has resulted in a world of 
legalistically phrased privacy policies that begin by assuring the 
consumer that the site cares about his or her privacy, but then proceeds 
to confuse the consumer with technical language about “affiliate” and 
“non-affiliate” sharing, required disclosures, distinctions between 
personally identifiable information (“PII”) and aggregate data, 
inapplicability with regard to other sites, or content that may be 
included or accessed from the site, and finish with the caveat that the 
privacy policy can change at any time, with or without notice.17  
 Both the 2003 and 2005 Annenberg surveys revealed, however, 
that American adults do not know that privacy policies merely tell 
people how the site will use their information: whether or not, and 
how, they will share it with affiliates and outside firms.18  Most 
 
 
 
 
15 A. F. Westin, “Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy,” Journal of Social Issues 59, 
no.2 (2003): 445.  
16 Ibid.  
17 For example, of 64 website privacy policies that were reviewed between 2001 and 2003, 
Jensen and Potts found that eight (13%) offered no mention of how changes to the policy 
would be conveyed to the user, twelve policies (19%) offered to notify users through email 
and a posting on the policy page, and 44 policies (69%) required users to check the policy 
page periodically.  C. Jensen and C. Potts, “Privacy Policies as Decision-making Tools: An 
Evaluation on Online Privacy Notices,” in CHI 2004 Connect: Conference Proceedings (New 
York: ACM Press, 2004), 471–78. 
18 Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 3; Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to 
Exploitation, 3. 
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Americans believe, logically, that the phrase “privacy policy” signifies 
that their information will be kept private.  In the 2003 survey, 57% of 
the nationally representative sample of 1,200 adults who were using 
the Internet at home agreed or agreed strongly with the statement, 
“When a web site has a privacy policy, I know that the site will not 
share my information with other websites or companies.”19  In the 
2005 survey, questioners asked 1,200 nationally representative adults 
who said they had used the Internet in the past month whether that 
statement is true or false; 59% answered it is true.20 
C.  CONSUMERS MISUNDERSTAND ONLINE DATA COLLECTION 
 The misunderstandings do not stop with the label.  The 2003 
survey found that 59% of adults who use the Internet at home know 
that websites collect information about them even if they do not 
register;21 however, they do not understand that data-flows behind 
their screens connect seemingly unrelated bits about them.22  The 
survey’s interviewers asked respondents to name a site they valued and 
then went on to ask their reaction to click-stream advertising,23 which 
is actually a common way that sites track, extract and share 
information to make money from advertising.  Of the surveyed adults 
who go online at home, 85% stated that they did not agree to the 
collection and aggregation of their data across multiple sites for 
purposes of click-stream advertising, even by a “valued” site.24  When 
offered a choice of using a valued site for free and letting information 
be collected, or paying for the site and not letting information be 
collected, 54% of adults who go online at home said that they would 
rather find the information offline than exercise either option 
presented.25  
 
 
 
 
19 Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 3. 
20 Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to Exploitation, 20. 
21 Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 3. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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 Among the 85% who did not accept the data-collection practice, 
one in two (52%) had earlier said that they gave or would likely give 
the valued site their real name and email address.26  Yet those bits of 
information are what a site needs to begin creating a stream of data 
about them—the very flow, personally identifiable or not, that they 
refused to allow in response to the scenario.  Moreover, 63% of the 
people who said they had provided this data had also agreed that the 
mere presence of a website privacy policy means that the website will 
not share data with other firms.27  Bringing these two results together 
suggests that at least one out of every three respondents who refused to 
barter their information either do not understand or do not think 
through the privacy outcomes of basic data-collection activities on the 
Internet. 
 Similarly, other fundamental processes involved in online 
interactions are not very well understood by the consumer.  In a related 
survey, Acquisti and Grossklags show that individuals are often unable 
to name obvious parties, beyond the merchant and the consumer, that 
have access to consumer data during and after an online credit card 
transaction, such as the credit card company.28  These findings help 
uncover the important distinction between knowledge about 
commercial practices that is active and actionable, and knowledge that 
is passive or completely lacking.  Most consumers have some passive 
knowledge about the roles played by credit card companies, other third 
parties, and technical processes, but it is doubtful that this knowledge 
is always available to them when they are actively making decisions. 
D.  CONSUMERS MISUNDERSTAND MANY RULES ABOUT PRIVACY IN 
THE MARKETPLACE 
 These misconceptions about information privacy and data practices 
are, however, merely the tip of an iceberg of consumer confusion 
concerning their rights and merchants’ rights to consumer information 
 
 
 
 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 23. 
28 When 119 university staff and students were confronted with the open-ended question: 
“You completed a credit-card purchase with an online merchant. Besides you and the 
merchant Web site, who else has data about parts of your transaction?” 34.5 percent of the 
sample answered “nobody,” 21.9 percent answered “my credit card company or bank,” and 
19.3 percent answered “hackers or distributors of spyware.” A. Acquisti and J. Grossklags, 
Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making, IEEE Sec. & Privacy 3, no. 1 (2005): 
26–33. 
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in the marketplace.  Table 1 lists true-or-false statements that the 2005 
Annenberg survey presented to its representative national sample.29  
The answers indicate a low level of understanding of consumer rights 
and redress in the marketplace.  A high proportion of consumers 
believe they have certain privacy rights—notably consistent with those 
provided under FIPPS—when they do not.  Others simply have no idea 
what rights they have. 
 
Table 1: True/false responses to statements about rules of 
profiling, behavioral targeting, price discrimination and recourse 
in the marketplace.  (1,500 persons sampled) 
 
 %T %F %DK 
Most online merchants give me the opportunity to 
see the information they gather about me.   
 47% did not know the right answer 
 
23 53 25 
Most online merchants allow me the opportunity to 
erase information they have gathered about me.  
 50% did not know the right answer 
 
19 50 30 
A website is allowed to share information about me 
with affiliates without telling me the names of the 
affiliates.  
 49% did not know the right answer 
 
51 29 20 
It is legal for an online store to charge different 
people different prices at the same time of day.   
 62% did not know the right answer 
 
38 29 33 
Respondent correctly identifies the name of a 
credit-reporting agency.   
 66% did not know the right answer 
 
34 66 -- 
By law, a site such as Expedia or Orbitz that 
compares prices on different airlines must include 
the lowest airline prices.   
 68% did not know the right answer 
37 32 31 
 
 
 
 
29 Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to Exploitation, 15. 
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Table 1: (continued) 
It is legal for an offline store to charge different 
people different prices at the same time of day.   
 71% did not know the right answer 
29 42 29 
    
Bold numbers indicate the correct answer.  Sums greater than 100% result 
from rounding errors.  DK=Don’t Know 
 
 A 2007 Golden Bear telephone survey of Californians reinforces 
the idea of consumer misunderstanding about online marketplace 
privacy policies and rules.30  This survey focused on people who have 
actually purchased items on the Internet and, as such, would 
presumably be more informed than participants in the Annenberg 
studies, who were adults who used the Internet for any reason.  
Moreover, the statements about rules and privacy policies in the 
Golden Bear survey were more varied than those in the Annenberg 
study.   
 Despite their presumably greater stake in commerce and privacy 
than the Annenberg respondents, the Golden Bear respondents 
followed the same pattern; almost 70% of the respondents knew that 
sites are allowed to keep records of their addresses and purchase 
histories.  The respondents’ knowledge was much worse, however, 
with respect to the other statements about privacy policies and 
marketplace rules, as Table 2 shows.  Note that when presented with a 
privacy-policy statement that was similar to the one in the Annenberg 
study—if a website has a privacy policy, it means that the site cannot 
sell information about your address and purchase information to other 
companies—the percentage of respondents who answered incorrectly 
was very similar, 55% in Golden Bear compared to 59% in 
Annenberg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 The 2007 Golden Bear Omnibus Survey was a random-digit telephone survey of 1,186 
English- and Spanish-speaking adults in California.  It was conducted by the University of 
California’s Survey Research Center using Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing 
(CATI) to landline and wireless phones from April 30, 2007, to September 2, 2007.  It was 
funded by the Survey Research Center.  The privacy questions were funded by the Samuelson 
Clinic.  
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Table 2: True/false responses to statements about rules of the 
online marketplace. 
 
 %T %F %DK 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 
site cannot keep records of your address and 
purchase history. (188 persons sampled)  
 30.9% did not know the right answer 
 
19.7 69.1 11.2 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 
site cannot give information about your address 
and purchases to the government. (208 persons 
sampled)  
 45.2% did not know the right answer 
 
36.1 54.8 9.1 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 
site cannot use information to analyze your online 
activities. (205 persons sampled)  
 47.8% did not know the right answer 
 
  37.1 52.2 10.7 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 
site cannot buy information about you from other 
sources to analyze your online activities.         
(251 persons sampled)  
 50.6% did not know the right answer 
 
39.8 49.4 10.8 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 
site cannot share information about your address 
and purchases with affiliated companies that are 
owned by the website. (207 persons sampled)  
 55% did not know the right answer 
 
47.8 44.9 7.2 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that 
you have the right to require the website to tell 
you what other businesses purchased your 
personal information. (208 persons sampled)  
 60.1% did not know the right answer 
 
51.9 39.9 8.2 
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Table 2: (continued) %T %F %DK 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that 
you have the right to obtain help from the website, 
if information you provided to it was used for 
identity theft. (198 persons sampled)   
 64.1% did not know the right answer 
 
49.5 35.9 14.6 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that the 
site cannot sell information about your address 
and purchase information to other companies. 
(231 persons sampled)  
 64.5% did not know the right answer 
 
55.4 35.5 9.1 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that 
you have the right to sue the website for damages 
if it violates your privacy. (230 persons sampled)  
 65.6% did not know the right answer 
 
53 34.3 12.6 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that 
you have the right to access your personal 
information stored on the site and correct it.    
(222 persons sampled)  
 72.1% did not know the right answer 
 
56.8 27.9 15.3 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that 
you have the right to be notified if the website has 
a security breach that leaks information about you 
to others. (215 persons sampled)   
 75.4 did not know the right answer 
 
64.7 24.7 10.7 
If a website has a privacy policy, it means that 
you have the right to require the company to 
delete your personal information upon your 
request.  (213 persons sampled)  
 77% did not know the right answer 
68.1 23 8.9 
    
Bold numbers indicate the correct answer.  Sums greater than 100% result 
from rounding errors.  DK=Don’t Know. 
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E.  PRIVACY NOTICES ALONE ARE INSUFFICIENT 
 Despite self-regulatory efforts, there remains substantial confusion 
among consumers about information privacy.  Much of the FTC’s 
attention has focused on the development of improved disclosures.  
Surveys, user studies, and focus groups do support the agency’s belief 
that users would welcome well-crafted, short notices in the hope that 
they will ease comprehension of privacy policies.  
 In research supported by the National Science Foundation Science 
and Technology Center, Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure 
Technologies (“TRUST”),31 researchers at U.C. Berkeley’s Samuelson 
Clinic have examined the utility of short notices and variations on 
notice timing in communicating about privacy, security, and other 
consequences of software installation.32  The installation of 
downloadable software almost always involves the click-through to 
privacy notices and EULAs.  Notices are usually presented in a 
separate screen during installation and are reasonably accessible to the 
user.  Users are involved in a main task of evaluating and deciding 
whether to install a piece of software.  Given that information about 
security, privacy, and functionality are disclosed during the installation 
process, this is a natural context in which to explore the utility of such 
notices and disclosures. 
 Recent studies involving EULAs suggest that they are largely 
ineffective as a means of communicating with consumers.  EULAs, 
terms-of-service agreements (“ToS”), and privacy policies present 
complex legal information.  Research shows that notices’ complexity 
 
 
 
 
31 This work was generously supported by the NSF Science and Technology Center, Team for 
Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technologies (“TRUST”), NSF CCF-0424422.  Computer 
trustworthiness continues to increase in importance as a pressing scientific, economic, and 
social problem.  As a consequence, there is an acute need for developing a much deeper 
understanding of the scientific foundations of cyber security and critical infrastructure 
systems, as well as their implications for economic and public policy.  In response to this 
need, TRUST is devoted to the development of a new science and technology that will 
radically transform the ability of organizations (software vendors, operators, local and federal 
agencies) to design, build, and operate trustworthy information systems for our critical 
infrastructure.  The Center brings together a team with a proven track record in relevant areas 
of computer security, systems modeling and analysis, software technology, economics, and 
social sciences.  See http://trust.eecs.berkeley.edu/ for details of all of TRUST’s research. 
32 For detailed results of the studies, see Nathaniel Good and others, “Stopping Spyware at the 
Gate: A User Study of Privacy, Notice and Spyware,” in Proceedings of the Symposium on 
Usable Privacy and Security (New York: ACM Press, 2005), 43–52; Nathaniel Good and 
others, “Noticing Notice: A Large-scale Experiment on the Timing of Software License 
Agreements” in Proceedings of CHI 2007 (New York: ACM Press, 2007), 607–16. 
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hampers users’ ability to understand such agreements.  For example, 
Jensen and Potts studied a sample of 64 privacy policies from high-
traffic and healthcare websites.33  They found that the policies’ 
formats, locations on the websites, and legal content severely limit 
users’ ability to make informed decisions based on them.34  
 In another study that produced similar results, Grossklags and 
Good evaluated the notice practices of 50 popular downloadable 
programs.35  The location and presentation of the notices differed from 
vendor to vendor, which would make it more difficult for consumers to 
find relevant information.  These notices were often difficult to 
understand or even read.  The average EULA was over 2500 words 
long and would require approximately thirteen minutes for a consumer 
of average reading skill to parse, according to accepted reading 
metrics.  Font sizes were often too small to be read easily and notices 
were displayed in comparatively small windows, for example, showing 
only one percent of the complete notice text at a time. 
 Research indicates that simplifying the notices has a limited effect.  
Masson and Waldron showed that simplifying the language of legal 
contracts, for example, by using easier words and replacing obscure 
terms with common ones, could not achieve very high degrees of 
comprehension.36  This is because “non-experts have difficulty 
understanding complex legal concepts that sometimes conflict with 
prior knowledge and beliefs.”37 
 Vila and others ask whether users will ever bother to read or 
believe privacy policies at all.38  They claim that because the cost of 
 
 
 
 
33 Jensen and Potts, “Privacy Policies as Decision-making Tools: An Evaluation on Online 
Privacy Notices.” 
34 Ibid. 
35 Jens Grossklags and Nathan Good, “Empirical Studies on Software Notices to Inform Policy 
Makers and Usability Designers,” in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Berlin: Springer, 
2008), 341–55.  Originally presented at Useable Security (USEC’07), February 15–16, 2007. 
Also available online at http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~jensg/research/ 
paper/Grossklags07-USEC.pdf. 
36 M.E.J. Masson and M.A. Waldron, “Comprehension of Legal Contracts by Non-experts: 
Effectiveness of Plain Language Redrafting,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 8 (1994): 67–85. 
37 Ibid.  
38 T. Vila, R. Greenstadt and D. Molnar, “Why We Can’t be Bothered Reading Privacy 
Policies - Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market,” in Proceedings of the Fifth 
International Conference on Electronic Commerce (Pittsburg: ICEC, 2005), 403–07.  Also 
available online at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~greenie/econprivacy.pdf. 
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misrepresentation in a privacy policy is low and that some of the 
privacy policies are not trustworthy, users do not feel it is worth their 
time to read or pay attention to them.39  In contrast, results from the 
2003 Annenberg survey suggest that relatively high proportions of 
adults with the Internet at home trust privacy policies; 71% agreed or 
agreed strongly, “I look to see if a website has a privacy policy before 
answering any questions.”40  Anecdotal evidence does, however, 
support the impression that people do not read the policies.  One 
software provider included a $1000 cash prize offer in a EULA that 
was displayed during every software installation.  It took four months 
and 3,000 downloads of the software for someone to notice the clause 
and claim the prize.41   
 Among 222 study participants, the Samuelson Clinic found that 
only 1.4% reported reading EULAs often and thoroughly, 66.2% admit 
to rarely reading or browsing the contents of EULAs, and 7.7% 
indicated that they have not noticed these agreements in the past or 
have never read them.42 
 Short and layered notices are one method that has been proposed to 
overcome these problems.  The Samuelson Clinic has performed a 
controlled study of short notices and timing of notices.  The study 
examined whether consumers were happy with their installation 
decisions after they were fully informed of the program’s activities; 
this is termed “regret.”  When downloading and installing programs, 
subjects were shown either the EULA by itself or the EULA and a 
short notice highlighting core aspects of performance, privacy and 
security.   
 During the post-experimental survey, all study participants were 
shown the short notices.  When asked whether they would install the 
programs they chose to install during the experiment, participants who 
received the short notices during the study were less likely to reverse 
their earlier decision to install software.  However, many users, both 
those who originally received the short notice and those who did not, 
expressed regret about their installation decisions after reading the 
short notice during the exit interview.  Overall, the incidence of regret 
 
 
 
 
39 Ibid.  
40 Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 18. 
41 Larry Magid, It Pays To Read License Agreements, 
http://www.pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp (accessed January 22, 2008). 
42 See 2007 Golden Bear Omnibus Survey. 
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was high.  Importantly, however, the incidence of regret was lower 
when short notices were received before program installation.  
F. OTHER FORCES ALSO PREVENT CONSUMERS  
FROM SUCCESSFUL PRIVACY PROTECTION 
 Beyond the issues of whether consumers read and comprehend 
privacy policies, individuals’ ability to make marketplace privacy 
decisions that reflect their needs is hampered by several factors.  
Incomplete information is a major difficulty.  Even when they read 
privacy notices and EULAs, consumers have trouble evaluating the 
consequences of disclosing the bundles of information that companies 
say they are taking.  Consumers have difficulty assessing and valuing 
certain privacy risks, which makes their decisions seem unpredictable, 
even random.  Sometimes risks become known only after a security 
breach or privacy invasion.   
 Moreover, while many consumers are certainly aware of many 
privacy risks, they may not be well informed about the magnitude of 
these risks in certain circumstances.  Acquisti and Grossklags report, 
for example, that 73% of respondents in their survey underestimated 
the risk of becoming a victim of identity theft.43   
Adding to the problem of incomplete information is the 
challenge of grasping the abilities of technologists to take 
seemingly innocuous items of information and link them in 
new, unexpected ways.  For example, when asked, “Imagine 
that somebody does not know you but knows your date of 
birth, sex, and zip code.  What do you think the probability is 
that this person can uniquely identify you based on those 
data?,” 68.6% answered that the probability was 50% or less 
(and 45.5% of respondents believed that probability to be 
less than 25%).  According to Carnegie Mellon University 
researcher Latanya Sweeney, however, 87% of the US 
population may be uniquely identified personally through a 
5-digit zip code, birth date, and sex.  To expect individuals 
to foresee such possibilities is unreasonable.44 
 
 
 
 
43 Acquisti and Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality. 
44 Ibid., 24. 
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Even if individuals have access to complete information about privacy 
risks and modes of protection, they might not be able to process 
enough data to formulate a rational privacy-sensitive decision.  Human 
beings’ rationality is bounded, which limits our ability to acquire and 
then apply information.  Furthermore, consumers are busy and 
experience many demands on their attention.  They cannot be expected 
to be familiar with all the vagaries of technologies, e-commerce, and 
evolving business practices. 
G. CONSUMERS ARE LIMITED IN THEIR ATTEMPTS  
TO PROTECT THEIR INFORMATION 
 Evidence abounds that consumers do try to protect their privacy.  
Survey results released in June 2004 by Privacy & American Business 
found that two-thirds of Americans have taken some steps to protect 
their privacy.45  In fact, 87% indicated that they had asked a company 
to remove their information from a marketing database; 60% decided 
not to patronize a store because of doubts about the company’s privacy 
protections; and 65% had declined to register at an e-commerce site 
because of privacy concerns.46  Among individuals that Westin has 
described as the “privacy unconcerned,” 47% reported that they 
engaged in four out of seven identified privacy-protecting behaviors, 
while 65% of the “privacy pragmatists” had engaged in these 
behaviors.47   
 Situational characteristics can reduce consumers’ efforts to protect 
their information.  For example, Spiekermann, Grossklags, and 
Berendt observed 171 study participants while they shopped online, 
specifically when they interacted with an anthropomorphic sales 
advisor.  By answering questions posed by the advisor, study 
participants could receive recommendations about products.  The 
advisor also asked questions that were highly intrusive of privacy or 
that requested irrelevant information.  Participants could simply have 
refused to respond to these questions, thereby protecting themselves 
against potential threats.  However, regardless of the strength of the 
participants’ self-reported privacy preferences, their actual responses 
 
 
 
 
45 Privacy & American Business, “New National Survey on Consumer Privacy Attitudes to be 
Released at Privacy & American Business Landmark Conference,” news release, June 10, 
2004.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Westin, “Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy,” 445. 
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to the advisor revealed much more information than their self-reported 
preferences predicted, even among the “privacy-concerned” 
individuals.  These results demonstrate the power of interactive 
marketing techniques to lead even privacy-motivated consumers to 
behave in ways that appear contradictory to their stated preferences.48  
The similarity between the behavior of the “unconcerned” participants 
and the behavior of participants who claim to be highly concerned 
about privacy suggests that Westin’s dichotomy may be less useful 
than previously thought in capturing the nuances of consumers’ 
attitudes on privacy.  
 Further evidence that we need a more differentiated understanding 
of protection behaviors is provided by Acquisti and Grossklags.49  
They found that at least 75% of the consumers did adopt at least one 
strategy or technology, or otherwise took some action, to protect their 
privacy, such as interrupting purchases before entering personal 
information or providing incorrect information in website forms.50  
However, they also found that use of specific technologies was 
consistently low across the sample population.51  For example, 67% of 
respondents never encrypted their email, 82% never put a credit alert 
on their credit report, and 82% never removed their phone numbers 
from public directories.52  
 Other findings suggest that while people would like to protect their 
privacy, and try to at the most basic levels, a large proportion of these 
people do not have the knowledge necessary to move beyond the very 
basics of privacy-protective behavior.  Before concluding that people 
do not put a credit alert on their credit report because they are lazy or 
uncaring, recall the Annenberg survey finding that 66% do not know 
the name of a credit agency and 76% do not correctly respond “false” 
to the statement, “the Federal Trade Commission will correct errors in 
credit reports if it is shown proof of the errors.”  
 
 
 
 
48 S. Spiekermann, J. Grossklags and B. Berendt, “E-Privacy in 2nd Generation E-Commerce: 
Privacy Preferences versus Actual Behavior,” in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on 
Electronic Commerce, (New York: ACM Press, 2001), 38–47.  Also available online at 
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~jensg/research/paper/grossklags_e-Privacy.pdf. 
49 Acquisti and Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making, 26–33. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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 In the online environment, the complexity of privacy-protecting 
actions increases, and thus the likelihood that Americans perform them 
decreases substantially.  The 2003 Annenberg survey asked American 
adults who use the Internet at home if they performed certain activities 
in relation to controlling their information online; 65% said that the 
have erased unwanted cookies at least once.  This finding is consistent 
with the finding that a clear majority of the sample—59%—was aware 
of what cookies do; people know that when they go online, sites 
collect information on them even if they do not register.  The 
percentage applying other privacy tools drops steeply, however.  Only 
43% said that they have used filters to block unwanted email, 23% 
said they have used software that looks for spyware, and 17% said 
they have used anonymizers—“software that hides your computer’s 
identity from websites that they visit.” 
IV.  WHAT THE FTC MUST CONFRONT IN THE NEXT DECADE 
A.  AMERICANS’ CONTINUING CONCERNS AND  
CONFUSIONS ABOUT INFORMATION PRIVACY 
 Research indicates that American consumers care deeply about 
information privacy and worry that it is not well protected.  It also 
reveals that great majorities of American consumers do not grasp basic 
facts about companies’ data collection practices, do not know the laws 
that govern data protection, do not read or comprehend the notices that 
are supposed to explain data practices and afford privacy choices, and 
are confronted with many social and psychological factors that 
undermine their ability to protect their privacy during marketplace 
transactions.   
 Most fundamentally, research indicates that a large majority of 
American adults believe that the existence of a “privacy policy” on a 
website indicates some level of substantive privacy protection for their 
personal information.  The finding is not an aberration.  Two major 
national surveys performed two years apart, in 2003 and 2005, 
revealed virtually the same percentage of Americans—almost 60%—
believed that “when a website has a privacy policy, that means it will 
not share information about them with other websites or companies.”53  
In the 2005 survey, where the statement was presented in true/false 
 
 
 
 
53 Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, 4; Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to 
Exploitation, 20. 
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form, 59% incorrectly said the statement was true and an additional 
16% said they did not know if it was true or false.54   
 Because American consumers mistakenly believe that a “privacy 
policy” indicates a level of substantive privacy protection, they do not 
read them.  The failure to read privacy policies leaves consumers 
unaware of data practices such as data-mining and allows a wide range 
of practices that are inconsistent with consumer expectations to avoid 
consumer scrutiny.  
 Under the Federal Trade Commission’s notice and choice regime, 
the operating assumption is that people will make good choices if they 
are provided with good information.  Our studies have found that 
Americans do not have good, i.e., full and understandable, information 
about data practices that affect their privacy.55  More significantly, 
even if full and understandable information is provided in a short 
format, consumers retain the belief that the mere invocation of the 
term “privacy policy” creates a baseline set of protections for their 
information.  That belief, along with other cognitive biases, limits the 
number of consumers who read and act on such privacy notices.  If a 
website contains a privacy policy that states it will reveal users’ data to 
affiliates or other companies without the users’ permission, then the 
privacy of consumers who stop reading once they see that a privacy 
policy exists is undermined. 
B.  THE CURRENT NOTICE-BASED APPROACH HAS CONSEQUENCES  
FOR THE SECURITY OF THE NETWORK ITSELF 
 Consumers’ basic misunderstanding of the purpose of privacy 
policies is one of many misconceptions that contribute to confusion in 
the online marketplace.  When consumers do not read, or read but 
cannot understand, privacy notices and EULAs on websites and 
software, they may unwittingly install malicious programs that exploit 
consumer machines to the detriment of the entire Internet.  Unless 
“privacy policies” provide some baseline privacy protections, the 
notice-based privacy regime will continue to unintentionally lead 
consumers to “consent” to invasive program installations and other 
practices.  By doing so, they lower the security protections of the 
entire network, not just their own computers. 
 
 
 
 
54 Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to Exploitation, 15. 
55 See Turow, Americans and Online Privacy; Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to 
Exploitation. 
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 One case in point is the 2005 wide-scale installation of a “rootkit” 
by purchasers of music CDs.56  In an attempt to control the distribution 
of songs on the CD, Sony bundled a program that ran silently in the 
background and opened many computers to security vulnerabilities.  
Similarly, spyware, even if “consensually” installed pursuant to a 
EULA, can allow millions of computers to be controlled by others.  
This allows bad actors to create “botnets,” e.g. zombie networks of 
consumers’ computers, which can be remotely directed to engage in 
denial-of-service attacks and other malicious acts.   
C.  THE NEED TO ADOPT THREE POLICIES  
TO SUPPORT INFORMATION PRIVACY 
 To advance privacy, the Federal Trade Commission should take 
the following three steps: 
1.  THE FTC SHOULD POLICE THE TERM “PRIVACY POLICY” 
 Two national surveys by the Annenberg Public Policy Center 
revealed that to a majority of American consumers, “privacy policy” 
carries a particular meaning: that a website will not disclose personal 
information to others without the consumer’s permission.  While many 
websites begin their privacy policies with the claim that “your privacy 
is important to us,” many of these same policies disclose further down 
that the websites collect quite a bit of the information from their users 
and often do share the information with affiliates, marketers, or other 
entities.  Note, too, that information-sharing agreements with third 
parties generally are under no legal requirement to be disclosed; there 
is no other source for this omitted information.  The result is a 
situation where consumers assume that the privacy policy label 
indicates that the site will not share data, whereas the opposite may be 
true and the policy may or may not state what is done with the 
information. 
 Given consumers’ expectations, the use of the term “privacy 
policy” absent some baseline privacy protections, ought to be 
considered deceptive.  The Commission evaluates potentially 
deceptive marketing communications to consumers based upon 
 
 
 
 
56 Deirdre K. Mulligan and Aaron K. Perzanowski, “The Magnificence of the Disaster: 
Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 22 
(2007): 1157. 
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whether the representation is “likely to mislead reasonable consumers 
under the circumstances.  The test is whether the consumers’ 
interpretation or reaction is reasonable.”57  The FTC’s guidance 
specifies that communications should be judged upon “the basis of the 
net general impression conveyed . . . .”58  The Policy Statement on 
Deception advances five model questions for evaluating a 
representation: how clear is the representation, how conspicuous is any 
qualifying information, how important is the omitted information, do 
other sources for the omitted information exist, and how familiar is the 
public with the product or service?59 
 Given consumer expectations, the use of the label “privacy policy” 
by websites that share information about their users without user 
permission is deceptive.  First, surveys demonstrate that reasonable 
consumers believe that the mere presence of a privacy policy means 
that substantive protections are in place to prevent the sharing of their 
information.  Websites’ top-level assertions about privacy are often 
very clear; sites abound with privacy seals and claims that “your 
privacy is important to us.”  As such, “privacy” is used as a marketing 
tool, a type of quality representation that consumers find meaning in 
and rely upon.  Qualifying information, by contrast, is buried within 
privacy policies in the fine print.  As we have shown, this qualifying 
information is often not understandable and often goes unread by 
consumers who presume that the policies extend many rights, and thus 
are not necessary to read.60  In cases where sites share information 
without consumer consent, therefore, the use of the term “privacy 
policy” is deceptive under FTC guidelines. 
 The Federal Trade Commission should rule, then, that websites 
using the label “privacy policy” are deceptive unless those sites 
promise not to share information about their users without their 
permission.  While sites that engage in such sharing without user 
permission should be required to make disclosures, they should not be 
allowed to refer to such disclosures as “privacy policies.”  
 
 
 
 
57 James C. Miller III, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (October 14, 1983).  Also available 
online at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 See Turow, Americans and Online Privacy; Turow, Feldman and Meltzer, Open to 
Exploitation. 
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2.  PRIVACY MECHANISMS SHOULD BE VETTED  
BY USABILITY AND OTHER EXPERTS 
 Currently, notices are written to satisfy lawyers.  The notices do 
not help consumers make privacy choices that reflect their privacy 
interests.  If the FTC wants consumers to make smart decisions on 
privacy, then experts in usability and other areas need a seat at the 
table.  Such experts need to help craft privacy-protecting mechanisms.  
Consumers would benefit from the involvement of experts in usability 
and psychology in designing notices and other privacy mechanisms.  
Research at the Samuelson Clinic and elsewhere is beginning to 
identify the features that can improve the chances that consumers read, 
comprehend and act upon privacy notices in a manner consistent with 
their needs and expectations.  The FTC needs to avail itself of that 
research and the expertise behind it. 
3.  THE FTC SHOULD SET BENCHMARKS FOR SELF-REGULATION 
 In announcing the 2006 Tech-ade hearings, Chairman Majoras 
asked: 
[W]hat have we learned over the past decade?  How can we 
apply those lessons to what we do know, and what we 
cannot know, as we look to the future?  And how can we 
best protect consumers in a marketplace that now knows no 
bounds, that is virtual, 24-7, and truly global?61  
 The FTC would be better equipped to evaluate what it has learned 
about self-regulation if it had adopted a reasonable recommendation 
offered by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Executive Director Beth 
Givens in 1996—that the agency set performance benchmarks for self-
regulation.62  Without benchmarks, self-regulation and regulation, for 
that matter, have no clear metrics for measuring success.  Accordingly, 
we recommend that the FTC define clear benchmarks for its privacy 
initiatives—educational, regulatory and self-regulatory—and evaluate 
its approach against those benchmarks between now and 2016.   
 
 
 
 
61 See Majoras, Anti-Spyware Coalition. 
62 FTC, Public Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the Global Information Infrastructure, n. 
156 (Dec. 2006). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 The next decade will bring new technologies that will be able to 
extract far more information from and about Americans than was 
previously possible.63  These technologies will raise new and complex 
privacy issues.  The FTC should plan its activities for the next decade 
based on a reasoned assessment of its policy initiatives over the last 
ten years.  While some progress has been made, it is clear that 
consumers remain unable to fully effectuate their privacy rights in the 
marketplace.  Providing consumers with more information about data 
practices has not led to greater consumer confidence or to a rich 
marketplace of privacy options for consumers.  It is clear that if the 
FTC continues to pursue a market-based approach, additional 
interventions are necessary to ensure that consumers are not misled 
and have straightforward information available that facilitates privacy 
choices. 
 
 
 
 
63 Turow, supra note 1. 
